On The Margins

Sunday December 24, 2006

[ Papers ] Multi-Lot Auction Design

Here is another academic presentation from my Haas years. It describes "Multi-Lot Auction Design: Applied to 3G Spectrum Auctions." I hope you can follow it. Like the previous paper I just posted, it needs some editing and work to bring it up to par. It is definitely worth a separate paper of its own if only time would allow.

Put together originally as a presentation for a game theory seminar, it distinguishes auctions involving multiple lots (items) of potentially complementary value from auctions involving identical lots (items). An example would be if you would participate in an auction involving pieces of adjacent properties of various sizes as opposed to auctions involving instances of the same object. Another example of the first kind, discussed in this paper, are spectrum auctions because these auctions are national and span multiple, but separate, municipalities and regions with value complementarities having to do with costs of maintaining a mobile network on a particular topography of auction licenses.

2006-12-24 00:54:28.0 -- ; Permalink ; Trackback.
3g academic auctions design multi-lot presentation spectrum

[ Papers ] A Transaction Cost Economics View of the Bullwhip Effect

I'm posting another one of my papers form the Haas years: "A Transaction Cost Economics View of the Bullwhip Effect." It was written in May of 2004. It does need another good round of editting. So, I might edit and repost it at a later time.

In short, this paper gives a TCE assessment of the bullwhip effect observed in supply chain systems. It was written as part of an independent study with professor Oliver Williamson, who was kind enough to review the work and provide some very valuable suggestions. It was an honor to learn a few things about TCE from him, and of courses, errors in this paper, including the typos and techincal ones, are all of my own.

2006-12-24 00:40:25.0 -- ; Permalink ; Trackback.
bullwhip business chain costs management supply transactions

Sunday October 15, 2006

[ Papers ] Credible Commitments vs. Credible Threats

As part of my interest in transaction cost economics, I've also been fascinated by the follies and excesses of modern strategy theory which focuses, almost exclusively, on a view of economic and social relationships based on anti-social power differentials as opposed to social interdependencies.

Here, I'm posting an essay (PDF) I wrote in May of 2003 on the concept of "credible commitments" in contrast to the-so-called "credible threats." The former concept has been used by prominent transaction cost economists while the latter remains a part of the common terminology in much of game theory.

(Again, anyone may use the essay  as long as the user provides appropriate reference to its origin and author.)

2006-10-15 21:54:37.0 -- Comments [4] ; Permalink ; Trackback.
economics game theory transactions

Friday October 13, 2006

[ Papers ] Efficient Adaptation in Long-term Contracts

Here is a commentary (PDF) I wrote in 2003 on “Efficient Adaptation in Long-term Contracts: Take-or-Pay Provisions for Natural Gas” Scott E. Masten and Keith J. Crocker (American Economic Review, vol. 75 (5), 1985).

If you want to make use of my commentary for a business school paper or otherwise, make sure you give an appropriate reference to it. In other words, use the well-known, common principle: No plagiarizing!

2006-10-13 23:39:24.0 -- ; Permalink ; Trackback.
contracts deals energy gas transactions