As promised, I offer here my reasons why a flex-wage plan, linked to a back-end severance package, would not work.

To make my proposal work, a firm would have to make raise the ante--either increase the duration or amount of the severance or, perhaps, increase the upside bonus in good years--to the degree that the overall compensation package would give that firm a competitive advantage in hiring. At this point, the risk to the firm of overall package would be too high. E.g., a downturn of sufficient gravity to compel large-scale layoffs might be catastrophic. (Keep in mind that a company that hires judiciously and is consistently profitable would fare as well under my proposal as it would operating without implementing my plan.)

Surprisingly to me, most workers I talk to don't cotton to my proposal. Most of the objections cite an unwillingness to take a pay cut, even with the "carrot" of a generous severance. I'm inclined to speculate that some of these individuals overrate their marketability. No matter. They believe they can do better under the current system.

As an aside, I'd assert that if we moved into a recession, worker sentiment toward a plan such as mine would change. On the employer side, a firm's offering could be lower than what it would have to be today and still be attractive.

While most workers seem to acquiesce in the current system, the "current system" is not what it used to be. In fact, firms are implementing flex wages, without the back-end severance. An article "Winners and losers in salary game," on CBS Marketwatch (which I'll not link to because the link won't last) by Andrea Coombes notes that:

Base salaries are expected to increase about 3.9% on average in 2008, matching the average pay increase in 2007, according to a new Towers Perrin survey of about 4,000 companies worldwide. Those results match a number of other salary-expectation surveys.

It's not much when you consider inflation in October rose at a 3.5% annual rate [now 4.3% since Nov. 2006]. But more employers now supplement salaries with one-time bonuses and rewards, with more than 90% of employers offering such "variable pay" this year, up from 80% in 2006, according to an annual survey of about 1,000 large U.S. employers by Lincolnshire, Ill.-based Hewitt Associates, the human-resources consulting firm.

So the flex wages, as implemented, are merely a different way of giving raises. High flyers will match or beat inflation; ordinary performers will fall behind. The wisdom of such a system is fodder for another article, but the key point here is that firms are not "flexing" to a degree that would cushion the blow of a downturn and thereby, possibly, preserve employment.

I think our current system of compensation and unemployment creates waves that are too destablilizing, both for an individual and for the economy as a whole. In large part, this is because US workers rely to the extent they do on their employers for various insurances. Single-payer health insurance would go a long way to shorten the length and duration of the down wave for an unemployed worker. In fact, this might be enough for macroeconomic purposes.

In the absence of health insurance reform, a proposal such as mine, with a generous severance on a declining scale, would dampen the downturn, without (I hope) killing firms' incentive to hire. In the current economic conditions, employees prefer a higher but less certain income over a possibly lower but more certain income. In terms of power and politics, employers have pretty complete flexibility to hire and fire and have no incentive to improve severance arrangements for the rank-and-file. In such an environment, it's every man for himself.

Comments:

You have no sense of real-world human behavior. Aside from whether the overall compensation would be better or worse if all the terms were met, nobody would sign up for this because there would be no trust that the employer would follow through on a compensation package. More than likely, a lot of employers would take advantage of short-term cheap labor and then renege on the back end. We have already seen this with deliberate negligence, called "unfunded pension obligations". Heck, even the national Congress is guilty of this in the way that Social Security and Medicare are oversubscribed. Our state legislatures are also incapable of enough forward planning to account for inevitable downturns in the economy, so they don't have any rainy-day funds accumulated. Business would be no different. Really, you should spend your time on problems and solutions with a chance of being implemented someday.

Posted by A. Reader on December 23, 2007 at 08:10 AM PST #

Well, I flatter myself that I have teensy-weensy bit of sense of real-world human behavior. But, insults aside, "A. Reader" makes an apt comparison between my scheme and the reneging on pension obligations on the part of many private firms. Without some sort of government mandate, there'd be no way a back-end payout as I described would work. My thinking was (and is) that, in general, market-based initiatives are better (more enduring, with at least the appearance of fairness) than government mandates. Certainly, in the US, the former is politically more acceptable than the latter. Robert Reich and Alan Blinder have written extensively (and lucidly) about forms of wage insurance (govt. mandates) that address the problem of income instability.

Posted by Terry Gibson on January 24, 2008 at 09:15 AM PST #

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