
Tuesday February 22, 2005
Until further notice, all new designs should use SHA-256. Existing
systems using SHA1 or MD5 should confirm that they only need second
pre-image resistance, not random collision resistance. Usage of MD5
in certificates should be discontinued unless the presence of adequate
mitigating controls has been verified.
also includes a sketch of antonie joux's result about the concatenation
of hash functions.
[musical recommendation while reading about the future of sha-N where N is 224/256/384/512:
Trio - Mozart: The Late Symphonies (etc) / Bernstein, Vienna Philharmonic, 3cd set,
Deutsche Grammophon. these Trio editions are a remarkable and affordable gift to
classical music lovers.]
[surprising that this paper was not slash-blotted, not that it matters anymore]
Posted by Derek Morr on February 22, 2005 at 02:26 PM EST #