The weekend's revelation that senior civil servants have serious misgivings about the viability and timing of the ID Cards programme is now followed by news that the 2008 deadline is likely to slip.
According to this article on the BBC site, the process of sending tender invitations out to potential vendors has been indefinitely postponed.
It could be that this is (among other things) an opportunity to open discussions about those of the system's requirements which remain unclear.
Subsequent statements in the article say that Home Office plans must be 'sequenced' in a way which is "coherent and addresses the priorities of British citizens as the home secretary has identified".
I noted back in March that implementation of the ID card legislation would necessarily span the office of at least one home secretary, at least one prime minister and potentially a government. It seems that the arrival of a new home secretary has already had quite an impact on the plans. The rest of the ramifications have yet to emerge.
Posted by racingsnake
@ 09:46 PM GMT+00:00
Never let it be said that we shy away from the big questions on this blog... so, what is this 'knowledge' stuff, anyway?
Catching up on the blogworthy things which happened towards the end of last week: I had a very interesting time on Saturday, going back to Oriel College for one of my former philosophy tutor's occasional 'Alumnus Philosophy Days'.
We heard two papers - one on 'What is Knowledge' and one on 'Persistence and Relativity'. As I never had anything to do with Philosophy of Physics, that second one was a bit of a challenge. The first one was OK by comparison, but some stuff had to be hauled out of very deep mental storage!
The weird thing was that both topics related to Identity (at least through my identity-bigot glasses... ;^):
As far as 'Knowledge' is concerned, the question of what counts as 'me knowing that you are you' is as good an example to take as any, and of course brings in factors like the validity/robustness of credentials;
When it comes to 'Persistence', one of the questions philosophers raise is 'what does it mean for an object to persist over time?'; if you change one leg of a table, the table still 'persists', but it's not identical in all respects. In the same way, we tend to want to say that I was Robin Wilton 20 years ago and I'm still Robin Wilton today, even if all the cells in my body have gradually been replaced in the meantime.
The proposal put forward by Professor Quassim Cassam on Saturday was based on work by Timothy Williamson, who says that there are a bunch of verbs like 'see that', 'deduce that', 'hear that', which are used to create statements which entail knowledge.In other words, if I "see that it's raining", then I know that it's raining.
There was a lot of argument around whether using 'see that' in that sense is just a synonym for 'know that'... but I think one has to give Williamson the benefit of the doubt and assume that he's thinking of something less trivial than that. I mean, he's currently the Wykeham Professor of Logic at Oxford - and has previously held posts at Oxford, Edinburgh University and Trinity College, Dublin, so I 'deduce that' he's onto something. ;^)
As I understand it, what he's trying to get at is that there are what he calls 'pathways to knowledge'. Some of those are direct sense experience (I'm being rained on), some are rational (I can apply rules to work out that 2 + 7 = 9, without any external sense data), some are 'testimonial' (you tell me that it's raining).
The position he's trying to improve on is that 'knowledge is justified true belief' - in other words, that if I believe that P, and P is true, and I'm justified in believing it (i.e. don't just happen to believe something true for bogus reasons), then I know that P is the case. (Where 'P' is some proposition, like 'Manama is the capital of Bahrain').
That analysis was OK up to the 60s, when Edmund Gettier came up with a counter-example to it. Since then, people have suggested that knowledge might be 'justified true belief plus x', where x is some magic ingredient.. but every time someone comes up with a candidate, someone else finds another counter-example.
I think the promising thing about Williamson's approach is that it opens up the opportunity for acknowledging that there may be different magic ingredients in different cases... each being one of his defined 'paths to knowledge'.
This may all be nonsense, of course*, because it's my probably-flawed interpretation of what Prof. Cassam said about Williamson's ideas. In a fit of sheer optimism I've sent off for a copy of his book, and that may or may not lead to further blogging on this topic.
Either way, I owe a big thank-you to David Charles for organising the day, which - socially and intellectually - was undiluted pleasure.
*Footnote: a bit of subsequent investigation suggests that my paragraph about 'different magic ingredients' probably is nonsense... or at least a mis-representation of Williamson's thinking. As I now understand it, he is not looking for a mystery ingredient at all, but rather is seeking to define what it is about knowledge that makes it knowledge. Looks like I'm going to have to try and read his book after all ;^)
Posted by racingsnake
@ 11:51 AM GMT+00:00
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