Robin Wilton's esoterica

The BBC has a story today reporting on a recent consultation exercise by the UK's Human Genetics Commission (I know, I know - another day, another Commissioner....). The consultation exercise concluded that the DNA profiles of innocent people should not be kept on the database.

A quick look at the HGC's website will reveal a link to comments from members of the public who have visited a travelling exhibition co-produced by the HGC, "Inside DNA - A Genomic Revolution". The 'headline' comment used as the link is that old chestnut "If you've got nothing to hide, you've got nothing to fear". If, like me, you've heard that argument advanced by (or in support of) policy-makers, I can recommend this short paper by Daniel Solove (Professor in the Law Faculty at George Washington University). My thanks to Caspar Bowden for the link. Prof. Solove succinctly argues that the "nothing to hide" position reflects either an over-simplistic understanding of privacy itself, or a misleading portrayal of the risks of having none.

Here's the HGC's own news item about the Inquiry and report, and here's a link to their Summary of  Conclusions... three pages well worth the read.

Among those conclusions, there were a number on which the inquiry was unanimous, including the view that the public is under-informed about the NDNAD and its use, both specifically (for instance, when a suspect is requested to provide a sample) and generally (for instance, when DNA evidence is presented in a court case).

It does seem anomalous that there should be no formal process for informing someone of their rights relating to the taking of a DNA sample, when one thinks of the clear boundaries within which the police must proceed, for example, when arresting someone, taking evidence, or executing a search warrant.

The HGC's Chairman, Sir John Sulston, described the basic issue as being one of clarifying the purpose of the NDNAD. Is it, he wonders, an "identity database" or a "criminal database"? Again, given that UK data protection law is fundamentally based on notions of "purpose of collection" and "purpose of use", isn't it both strange and dangerous that the NDNAD should have been in operation this long with that question still apparently unaddressed?

The inquiry also returned 'majority' conclusions on a number of questions, including the following:

- That the DNA profiles of those not subsequently charged or convicted should not be retained (as is already the case in Scotland);

- That the DNA samples from which those profiles were generated should, likewise, be destroyed if the individual is not subsequently charged or convicted;

- That UK samples and profiles should not be contributed to any international foresnic DNA repository, or be the subject of automatic data-sharing with other countries.

Not unexpectedly, the Home Office representative quoted in the BBC piece expresses a slightly different view, saying that the database has 'revolutionised the way the police protect the public' and giving a number of statistics relating to the NDNAD's use by the police. These related to about 11,500 cases in which 'DNA evidence was used in police investigations' into offences ranging from rape and violent crime to domestic burglaries, but - strangely - not mentioning murder at all.

Perhaps this is just another piece of fallout from Gordon Brown's June speech to the IPPR, which so recently did so much to cast doubt on the statistical basis for quantifying the benefits of the NDNAD as a forensic tool.