Robin Wilton's esoterica

       
 

The UK ID card debate: let's keep it clean


Look, I know that nothing makes for a better article than the prospect of two people having a punch-up in public, albeit a verbal one. But I think we need to be very careful not to let our natural vicarious blood-lust divert us from the relevant facts. The BBC New site today reports a new row over projected costings for the UK ID Card proposals. As I mentioned last Sunday evening, Andy Burnham (Parliamentary Undersecretary of State at the Home Office) and Simon Davies (one of the authors of the LSE report on the proposals, back in June 2005) had two debates in quick succession on the subject. One on the 8th and one on the 9th of November. I was at the second but not the first, and I don't know for sure to which debate the BBC article refers. However, I can say this with certainty: during the discussion on the 9th., the Minister criticised those who he said were 'making wild claims' about the ID card proposals (for instance, about the possible cost of the scheme) not because they were truly concerned about the costs, but because they had other objections to the scheme in principle (the implication being that those other objections are less rational and/or would rapidly be demolished if aired in open debate). Now, I have two problems with this tactic: First, it may be true that there are people who have deeply-held objections to the scheme but choose to argue against it on the basis of other factors. So, for instance, there may be those who fear the privacy impact of a national ID register, but argue against it on grounds of practicality. That does not mean that either their arguments on grounds of practicality or their underlying concerns about privacy are invalid. Nor would it mean that their arguments on grounds of practicality should be summarily dismissed. Unfortunately, that is what Mr Burnham seemed to be trying to do in respect of the arguments on grounds of cost. Second, it seems clear to me that arguments against the scheme on grounds of cost could be easily proven or refuted if the cost projections were openly and fully published. The LSE report earlier this year was published using the best estimates the authors could get, derive or extrapolate, but without the benefit of a clear set of figures from the Home Office. Similarly, if it is not until now that the scope of the Home Office costings starts to become apparent (for instance, the fact that it will not include the cost of integration with other departmental systems, or the cost of verification systems such as biometric readers), then criticisms of the proposals should not be rejected purely becaue they are based on a 'best guess' in the absence of published figures. 'Mr Burnham said a report from accountants KPMG had concluded the government's estimates were robust".' But only excerpts from the report have been made public. Am I overly cynical to assume that those would be the excerpts which are most supportive of the proposals? I would be interested to know if anyone has requested a copy of the report under the Freedom of Information Act. The broader point about costings is this: it is now clear that the charge a citizen pays for a card will, at most, cover the cost of enrolment, credential issue and renewal, and operation of the register. The Home Office says that will cost £584m. It says it thinks use of the ID cards "could save the government between £310m and £575m in preventing fraud; between £30m and £40m in immigration control; and between £45m and £85m in reducing the cost of crime". But it is clear that the majority of those savings can only be accrued by departments other than the Home Office (for instance in cases such as fraudulent claims for healthcare or benefits payments), and that the cost to those departments of participating in the ID Cards scheme forms no part of the published cost case. That is a substantial hole, and deserves to be highlighted. Casting aspersions on the motivation of critics does not advance the argument. If the government's plans are cost-justifiable, the figures should be published in full and allowed to stand up in their own right.
 
 
 
 
Comments:

i'm 28, a reasonably decent hard working person. and this id scheme is the single most worrying change to lifestyle that's happened in my lifetime. once you go down this road it'll be impossible to come back. 'passive' monitoring of motor vehicles is also scheduled by automatically reading numberplates. this means you can be tracked from when you leave your house in the morning all day. for public transport you'll need your id so you can be tracked that way too. the whole thing is terrifically frightning and i'm worried that my kids are going to grow up in a hugely different society to the one i enjoyed. moer info here: http://www.no2id.net/

Posted by bsr on November 18, 2005 at 01:32 PM GMT+00:00 #

Baroness Scotland of Asthal, the Home Office Minister in the House of Lords, cast aspersions on the LSE Identity Project report during Tuesday's Committee stage debate. During Wednesday's debate she did the same, to both the LSE Identity Project report, and also to Simon Davies personally, from the priviliged position of the Front Bench in the House of Lords.

Do you recall any mention of the 6 million sample fingerprint database, derived from the Mexican visa Border Crossing Card in the United States, in any of the Home Office's published documents on the Identity Cards Bill ?

Baroness Scotland also claimed that "I am confident that we can be relatively sure that the hackers of the United Kingdom tend not to pore over the conversations reported in Hansard. I look forward to being proved wrong, but we should not hold our breath on that being the reality."

Security through obscurity ?

From the little revealed in public about the KPMG report, it said that the Goverment's <strong>methodology</strong> for their cost estimates was "robust", but, like everyone else with experience of the industry, they were not inclined to automatically believe the idea that the plastic smartcards themselves could actually be guaranteed to last the wear and tear which the public will subject them to over 10 years.

No mass market smartcard has ever been guaranteed to do so in the past, which was one of the LSE costing assumptions which the Government criticised.

As for getting hold of the full KPMG report via a Freedom of Information Act request - good luck !

We are still awaiting the Preliminary Decision of an Appeal to the Information Commissioner for the refusal of either the Home Office or the Treasury's Office for Government Commerce to honour our FOIA request to publish the, by now out of date, OGC Gateway stage Zero Reviews of the Home Office Identity Cards Project, which would not even contain any commercially sensitive information,

Posted by Watching Them, Watching Us on November 18, 2005 at 04:23 PM GMT+00:00 #

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Such views as I express in this blog are based on my own opinions, experience and judgements. They do not necessarily represent the policy or views of my employer. It is not my intention to offend readers in any way. If you find anything on this blog offensive, please contact me in the first instance.
Robin Wilton
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